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THE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF PRODUCER COOPERATIVES
WITHIN COMMAND ECONOMIES: EVIDENCE FOR THE CASE OF POLAND
Derek C. Jones
I. Introduction
The principal objective of this paper is to provide evi­
dence on important dimensions of the efficiency of producer 
(industrial/worker) cooperatives (PCs) within a command econ­
omy. The data are evaluated from the perspective of compet­
ing views on cooperative performance. The study is based on 
data for PCs belonging to the Central Union of Work Coopera­
tives (CZSP) in Poland. The CZSP comprises about 1500 PCs 
which employ about 800,000 workers, about 200,000 of whom are 
disabled. It accounts for about 10% of the industrial and 5% 
of the agricultural output of Poland. This is by far the 
largest PC sector in Europe, in both absolute and relative 
terms. The study concentrates upon a sample of industrial 
PCs in clothing, printing and construction for which annual 
enterprise level data were collected during the period 1 97 6- 
1980. Panel data of this sort are quite scarce for command 
economies. Additional data have been culled from scattered 
Polish sources, including Polish cooperative documents.
The principal motivation for this study is the fact that 
little is known about the comparative performance of PCs and 
state owned firms within command economies. Yet such re­
search has great potential significance in light of the re­
cent proposals for and implementation of reforms in Eastern 




























































































pation (Woodall, 1982). Furthermore, while there have been a 
number of recent theoretical and empirical studies concerned 
with the performance of PCs within advanced capitalist econo­
mies, and for the Yugoslav self-managed economy, there has been
1no systematic study of PCs within command economies. Yet it
is only within command economies that PC sectors are large.
Thus, in view of the keen interest by policy makers in worker
2participation and self-management in both East and West, valu­
able lessons may be learned from studying the Polish experi­
ence .
The paper is organized as follows. I begin with a brief 
historical account and a description of organizational struc­
ture. In the next part, hypotheses on cooperative performance 
drawn both from the formal and informal theory of the labor 
managed firm as well as discussions of cooperatives within com­
mand economies are presented and evaluated. This discussion is 
organized around two important issues: (i) the technical effi­
ciency of -Polish PCs compared to other Polish firms, and (ii) 
the distribution of income among PCs compared to other Polish 
firms. The empirical strategy is largely determined by the 
methods used in reference studies. (For example, when estimat­
ing the nature of income differentials among Polish PCs, the 
empirical analysis of Flakierski (1981) for all Polish firms is 
replicated for PCs alone.) The paper concludes with an inter­
pretation of the results and a brief consideration of the re­




























































































II. History and Organization
The first known Polish industrial PC was formed in Lwow in 
1873 (Kowalak, 1981) and, until the second world war, handfuls 
of PCs existed as part of a larger cooperative network. After 
1945, though, the PC form began to flourish in Poland. Follow­
ing the war, small groups of unemployed workers, usually 
craftsmen who used to work in highly labor-intensive industries 
such as textiles, clothing and leather, spontaneously estab­
lished PCs so that by 1948 more than 1500 existed. This first 
wave of PCs were formed essentially on a voluntary basis and 
without a supporting institutional framework. Soon, however, a 
series of measures were undertaken by the state to foster the 
growth of PCs. PCs were sometimes seen as a complement to the 
preferred form of organization, that of state ownership, espe­
cially as they helped to provide jobs for unemployed workers in 
rural areas, who were often female. Disabled workers were an­
other group for whom the PC form was judged by the state to be 
highly appropriate.
The number of industrial PCs peaked in the late 1950's or 
early 1960's at about 3400 and thereafter fell by more than 
half to a little over 1500 in 1978. But this reduction prima­
rily reflects a massive merger movement. Average employment in 
industrial PCs has continued to grow throughout the postwar pe- 
riod (from 70 in 1948 to more than 500 in 1978) as has the
share of industrial output and, more noticeably, the share of
4industrial employment which in 1978 was about 15%.
Most PCs continue to be in light industries; textiles, 




























































































share of industrial output. In these industries capital require­
ments are low. In 1976-1980, for example, capital-labor ratios 
in sample PCs in clothing averaged about £530.00 at the official 
exchange rate, less than a quarter of what it had been in similar 
firms in Britain in 1968 (see Table 1). Yet PCs do exist in many 
sectors. They account for more than 5% of industrial output in 
several areas including metal, precision instruments, electronics 
and chemicals. Polish PCs are not confined to labor intensive 
industries characterized by slow rates of technical change where 
substantial out-working remains.
By international standards (see Table 1) Polish PCs are, on 
average, by far the largest. Moreover, they are getting bigger. 
In 1976 almost 30% of Polish PCs employed more than 500 workers, 
almost double the fraction in 1974. Most PCs are multiplant, 
with industrial PCs on average having about 5 manufacturing 
plants and about 17 servicing establishments (Kistryn, 1980:18). 
Consequently, though average employment in Polish PCs has grown 
rapidly, average employment in plants in Polish PCs has grown 
much more slowly from about 16 in 1960 to 21 in 1978.
Relationship with the State
Unlike cooperatives in most Western mixed-capitalist econo­
mies (and in many other East European countries), Polish coopera­
tives, including PCs, receive endorsement from the Polish consti­
tution. A multitude of fairly detailed regulations provide the 





























































































But the most important difference between Polish coops 
and coops in Western mixed economies, reflects the fact that 
the Polish economy is centrally planned. Since 1945, most 
prices for inputs and outputs have been set by Polish central 
planners. Consequently the sovereignty of Polish PCs is se­
verely circumscribed. The degree of sovereignty for primary 
PCs is particularly limited if the second and third degree 
PCs (the federations) such as the CZSP (see on) are regarded 
as having primarily played a role as arms of the planning 
process. In addition, the Communist Party presumably exerts 
some degree of political control within enterprises. But in 
principle at least Polish PCs have been less regimented and 
have had more discretion in areas such as capital use and ad­
ministration. Whether or not both divisions of the social­
ized sector (state and cooperatively owned) have been affect­
ed equally by the planning process is an empirical matter.
Internal Organization of Primary Cooperatives
Cooperative legislation in Poland is guided by the uni­
versally recognized principles of cooperatives belonging to 
the International Cooperative Alliance: one member, one
vote; free and voluntary membership; limited remuneration of 
the underwritten capital. In terms of the specific institu­
tional arrangements within Polish PCs, this means that in 
principle there are a number of ways in which worker partici­
pation may operate. These may be classified into two broad 
categories--those channels which provide for worker partici­
pation in decision making and those features which enable 
workers to participate in material ways. We begin by consid- 




























































































control. First, unlike many PCs elsewhere which permit non-work­
ers to be members, PCs in Poland only allow workers to be members. 
Though membership is not required of workers, in practice most 
workers do choose to become members. Thus, in the sample of PCs 
used here, an average of more than 80% of workers had assumed mem­
bership (Table 1, values of MEMB). Another channel for control 
follows from understanding the structure of control within Polish 
PCs. The main organ of de jure control is the General Assembly of 
members which approves the budget and decides the distribution of 
the surplus. The Assembly elects the members of the Council, 
which is the body charged with formulating basic policy and is 
usually about twelve strong. In the sample PCs, the average coun­
cil had 15 members and workers in non-managerial grades usually 
comprised a majority of the council (Table 1, values for WKBD). A 
management board of 3-5 members handles the daily business activi­
ties of the cooperative. The board is either elected by the Gen­
eral Assembly or approved by the Council.
Worker participation in material channels comes in two forms 
— in ownership and in surplus. Worker membership requires under­
writing a share of the capital (net worth). In the sample of PCS; 
however, during 1976-1980 the average ownership stake equalled on­
ly about 10% of the average monthly wage. Nonetheless, capital 
stakes are returned in full to members when they leave the firm. 
Also, though payments to capital are not regarded as a cost— there 
is no requirement that interest be paid on the underwritten capi- 
tal— in practice the payment of interest on share capital is re­
garded as the first charge on the surplus (profits) and the recent 




























































































this particular participation channel producing incentive effects 
is that, in the event of the PC sustaining a loss, losses are 
covered out of member's shares. That is, if a Polish PC records 
negative earnings, an equivalent amount is subtracted from the 
value of members' share capital.
If the PC makes a surplus the after tax (net) surplus is di­
vided in two parts, a minimum of 45% of which represents the 
funds earmarked for development, with the balance, a maximum of 
55%, representing funds earmarked for consumption. Of the funds 
earmarked for consumption, not more than one half can be used as 
a bonus to labor. In sample PCs, an average of 28% of the net 
surplus was distributed in this way. Distribution is based on 
earnings and cannot exceed an amount equal to three months' earn­
ings. Members who have not fully paid up their declared capital 
will receive at least part of their share in the surplus in the 
form of shares. But for the majority an amount not exceeding the 
value of one month's earnings is given as cash. In fact, in the 
sample an average amount equal to about 5% of monthly wages was 
distributed in this way. The balance is placed in a non-interest 
bearing account which members may draw upon for special reasons. 
The balance of the funds earmarked for consumption is used for 
collective consumption activities— -social, educational and sport­
ing. Of the funds earmarked for development, roughly equal 
amounts go to new investments in the cooperative, the coopera­
tive's reserves and as loans which the PC is required to make to 
the Development Fund administered by the Central Union. Interest 
is paid on these..loans and the Central Union permits member PCs 




























































































Only about 5% of established cooperatives' assets are pro­
vided by funds which members own individually. The majority 
comes from the coop's collectively owned reserves and from loans 
from the Central Union. About 20-25% comes from loans from 
banks. However, bank credit is much more important in the estab­
lishment and development of new PCs.
Federations (Second and Third Degree Cooperatives) and Rela­
tions Among Primary Cooperatives
We conclude this section by considering the role of the Cen­
tral Federation (the CZSP) and relations among PCs. All indus­
trial PCs in Poland are members of the CZSP which has a staff of 
about 400. Most of these are economists, lawyers and engineers 
who perform a variety of managerial tasks. Fundamentally the 
CZSP has a political function as a representative of the inter­
ests of PCs before the state, including the initiation of legis­
lative proposals that concern industrial PCs. Another task is to 
monitor and evaluate the state of democracy in PCs. A department 
of self-government collects and analyzes information on matters 
including the size, sex, and occupational composition of the 
board and council and the frequency of meetings of the main or­
gans of cooperative government. The CZSP is an economic resource 
center and an economic watchdog too. In addition to providing a 
welter of technical and economic services, such as auditing and 
economic analysis, the CZSP stands ready to provide assistance to 
member firms that are in economic distress. The CZSP administers 
several centralized funds. Largest is the Cooperative Develop­
ment Fund, the result of the pooling of loans and payments from 




























































































PCs, rather than as seed capital, and prevailing interest rates 
are paid. However, the fund is sometimes drawn upon to subsi­
dize firms in crisis and to protect jobs. Also, the existence 
of a central pool of savings administered by a group of highly 
skilled professionals enables the CZSP to act as a guarantor of 
credit for individual PCs applying for bank loans. Other cen­
tral funds finance training centers and research and develop­
ment. About 90 technical schools are supervised by the CZSP. 
Research and development is facilitated both by the engineering 
staff at the CZSP and the people employed in specialized devel­
opment centers at the branch level. Various other joint under­
takings among PCs also exist such as design offices and common 
warehouses; all such institutions tend to be organized by the 
CZSP. Consistent with the socio-educational dimension of Pol­
ish PCs, the CZSP oversees a large network of educational, cul­
tural, social and sporting institutions and networks.
Specialist export institutions are supervised by the CZSP. 
Links- between PCs are developed in other ways besides member­
ship of the CZSP. Some industrial PCs which are engaged in 
similar activities, join a trade federation; such is the case 
with PCs in the toy industry and PCs which produce medical and 
laboratory apparatus. In other areas, only some PCs, usually 
those which export much, belong to a trade group, such as the 
branch union of clothing and textile PCs. Currently there are 
ten branch unions of industrial PCs. Industrial PCs which 
mainly produce for or serve the local market associate in 49 
vovoid (regional) unions. A major task of yoyoid unions is to 
help members with marketing and in providing market forecasts. 



























































































also fostered in Poland. The Central Union, for example, has se 
cured a long term agreement with its counterparts in retail coop 
eration.
III. Theory
Hypotheses about the behavior of PCs in command economies 
may be derived from two sets of economics literature. First 
there is a large literature written by specialists in the econo­
mies of East European economies, such as Brus (1975) and Gomulka 
(1982). Second there is a growing literature concerned with the 
economies of labor managed firms, some of which is critically re 
viewed by McCain (1982). The relevance, however, for both sets 
of literature for the case of Polish PCs is questionable. For 
the East European literature in large part this doubt reflects 
not only a failure to develop a satisfactory theory of the so­
cialist firm (Blazyca, 1980) but also a preoccupation with non- 
cooperative organizations.  ̂ The usefulness of much theoretical 
work on labor managed firms for the analysis of PCs which exist 
often as small sectors with non-labor managed economies is doubt 
ed by many, including Stephen (1 982) . Hence empirical work on 
the behavior of PCs within command economies must be guided by 
hypotheses drawn largely from informal theorizing within these 
two broad sets of literature. When this approach is adopted it, 
nevertheless, does result in the emergence of widely differing 
hypotheses. This may be illustrated by reference to issues in 
two broad areas of microstatic efficiency: (i) technical effi-
7ciency; (ii) distributional efficiency. In each case the effi­
ciency of Polish PCs can be evaluated with respect either to oth 




























































































In the literature on East European economies, the conven­
tional view apparently is that the centralized features of these 
economies along with penetration and political control within 
firms by the Party apparatus affects PCs and non-cooperative 
firms in broadly similar ways. Consequently, so the argument 
goes, the ostensibly distinct internal organization of PCs is in 
reality an empty shell. Brus (1975:36) puts it this way:
". . . in practice, the real economic differences between state 
and cooperative forms of ownership were quickly reduced to a 
minimum". Consequently since PCs are expected to behave no dif­
ferently than other firms, neither technical nor distributional 
efficiency would be expected to be affected by form of ownership 
or organization.
If, however, state policy has a differential impact on co­
operative versus state owned firms then efficiency differences 
would be expected to occur. Two important illustrations come to 
mind. A policy favoring the state owned sector in the alloca­
tion of investment funds (Kleer, 1980) might be expected to de­
crease average technical efficiency, when measured by output per
g
worker, of PCs compared to state owned firms. Furthermore, un­
equal allocations of capital within the state owned sector (and 
consequently wide dispersion in capital-labor ratios) might be 
expected to produce larger inter-enterprise income differences 
among state owned firms than among PCs where investments were 
more evenly disbursed. Second, a policy promoting the develop­
ment and extension of material incentives in PCs and their disa­
vowal in state owned firms, would be expected by those who argue 
that material incentives under socialism produce a more motivat­



























































































average technical efficiency among PCs (and perhaps less distrib­
utive efficiency) compared to state owned firms. Some, however, 
do not believe incentive payments to be effective unless they 
represent at least 25% of average earnings (Pick, 1968). Others 
(Drewnoswski, 1982:74-83) believe incentive systems in all forms 
of organization in East European economies result in negligible 
effects when the " . . .  tissue of the economic structure" has 
been degraded. All seemingly agree, however, that policy changes
that affect both sectors equally would not be expected to produce
9changes in relative efficiency.
Turning to the theoretical economic literature that deals 
with participatory and labor managed firms, though much work ana­
lyzes the expected relationship between participation and per­
formance (technical efficiency), there has been relatively little 
formal theorizing. Moreover, most theorizing is of limited rele­
vance for actual PCs which differ markedly in, for example, in­
ternal organizational characteristics, between and within coun­
tries (see Estrin et al., 1 983) . In addition, most theorizing 
does not appreciate the complex nature and patterns of interac­
tion that exist between performance and different channels of 
participation. Therefore again we must turn to the informal lit­
erature.
In reviewing the informal literature, one of the ways in 
which different authorities have approached the topic is to focus 
on the outcomes or the effects on performance of participation. 
Often the concern is with the overall or the (net) efficiency ef­
fect, and frequently the tendency is to focus on clusters of par­



























































































are distinguished: (i) those that operate through worker partici­
pation in decision making (as members of the entrepreneurial group 
or of various decision making bodies) and (ii) those that operate
primarily through material incentives (e.g. participation in own-
1 0ership, in surplus and in lending). Broadly speaking, there are 
three different positions.
One group of theorists predict positive overall efficiency 
effects flowing from participation. Vanek (1970, 1975) stresses 
the benefits to productivity that result primarily from worker 
participation in decision making. For Vanek, material incentives 
are subordinate, but of these most important is surplus sharing. 
Horvat (1982) stresses the productivity effects flowing from genu­
ine worker power also, though for him worker participation in own­
ership may be a practical necessity for efficient PCs. For both 
Vanek and Horvat, however, the full productivity effects are only 
realized if the PC is structured in particular ways. PCs which 
come closest to the optimal structure will be expected to perform 
best, not only as compared to other PCs but also as to non-partic- 
ipatory firms. Vanek's conditions for organizational efficiency 
may be classified into various groups of which three are most im­
portant for our purposes: (i) ultimate control and authority are
vested in those who work (at a minimum this means that all workers 
in a PC are members, or MEMB=1); (ii) ownership rights whereby 
capital owners receive a yield that reflects the scarcity price 
and which does not emphasize (and preferably avoids) collective 
ownership of assets; (iii) a shelter organization which funds and 
promotes the PC sector. Horvat (1982) concurs but adds another 



























































































Cable and Fitzroy (1980) also predict an overall positive ef­
fect of participation. But their theoretical framework stresses 
both material and non-material causes, and argues that there are 
powerful interactions, notably between surplus sharing and partic­
ipation in decision making. Material incentives matter most for 
Oakeshott (1978) (see also Clayre, 1980). Large individually 
owned capital stakes are viewed as essential for generating high 
productivity in participatory firms.
On the pessimistic side the strongest case is made by Jensen 
and Meckling (1979) who see all channels of participation as hav­
ing deleterious efficiency effects. As PCs provide increasing op­
portunities both for worker participation in decision making and 
for material incentives, they predict increasing enterprise inef­
ficiency. Inefficiencies allegedly result from worker participa­
tion in decision making in part because of the problem of prefer­
ence formation when worker preferences are not identical. The 
monitoring argument is used to support the claim that participa­
tion in profits by workers will produce inefficiencies. They ar­
gue that as the labor force grows, each individual will have a 
stronger incentive to shirk; consequently shirking will become 
more difficult and expensive to detect. Worker participation
through all channels is expected to be particularly dysfunctional
11in larger firms.
There is a third position at this general/overall level of 
argument. While most theorists argue as though the net efficiency 
effects of participation will always be of similar nature (direc­
tion) and size for all PCs, Nelson (1981) argues that, because 



























































































variables (such as job satisfaction), it may be more reasonable 
to argue that participatory effects will differ by size, by sec 
tor, by year and by type of firm. This, therefore, is essen­
tially a random effect, rather than a general view with varying 
predictions. Or it could be that there are systematic varia­
tions, but that the number of relevant variables is much higher 
and the patterns of interaction are much more complex than has 
been assumed thus far in theoretical and empirical work.
IV. Evidence
In this section various methods are used to evaluate the 
economic performance of Polish PCs, mainly in the sense of stat­
ic distributive and technical efficiency. Since the focus is on 
comparative performances, for the most part the research strate­
gy, in particular the choice of measures, is dictated by what 
information is available for enterprises with which meaningful 
comparisons can be drawn. (Benchmark firms are other Polish- 
state owned firms in similar industries and other Polish coops 
that are not worker managed.) In other words, for the sake of 
discussion I usually have used the same indicators for PCs and 
these other firms, despite the fact that they often have differ­
ent goals. Some evidence is drawn from Polish studies and offi­
cial statistics that tend to focus on sectoral performance. But 
most evidence is derived from the new enterprise-level data set 
for a sample of Polish PCs during 1976-1980.
Distributional Efficiency
In Table 2, Part A, I present data that compare the disper­



























































































documented by Flakierski, with comparable data for average net
1 2earnings for a sample of Polish worker cooperatives. While co­
operative data for 1976 and 1978 are available for three indus­
tries— construction, clothing and print— data for the overall so­
cialized sector usually are available for these years only at 
higher levels of aggregation--for all firms and all industry, 
though separate data are available for construction.
The data enable two clear inferences to be drawn. First, 
average and median incomes of workers in cooperatives are consid­
erably lower than for workers in the overall socialized sector. 
For example, in 1976, excluding bonus payments, an average coop­
erative construction worker earned 88% (4061/4633) of the earn­
ings of his counterpart in the socialized sector. By 1978 the 
ratio had fallen to 79%. Even if the monthly bonus received by
cooperative workers is included, the ratio rises only to 85%
1 3(4491/5298). Moreover, though data for cloth and print are not 
available for the overall socialized sector, the comparative po­
sition of .workers in these cooperative industries is likely to be 
even worse because coop construction workers typically receive 
about 25% more than coop workers in cloth and print, while in the 
socialized sector, construction workers earn only about 15-17% 
more than the total industry average.
The second inference is that inter-enterprise income differ­
entials are strikingly narrower in Polish PCs than in socialized 
firms as a whole. This finding is convincingly supported by all 
three measures of income distribution. For example, the decile 
ratio (P^ /P ) shows inequality in the three cooperative sectors 



























































































socialized sector the corresponding ratios are much higher, 2.93 
(industry, 1976) and 3.33 (building, 1976) respectively. Howev­
er, these comparisons exclude the widening effect of including 
cooperative bonuses. When these are added the degree of disper­
sion in average incomes among coops increases and ranges from 
1.43 to 1.88. But this is still far below the spreads for the 
socialized sector as a whole. The other indicators of inequali­
ty reveal an essentially similar pattern of narrower dispersion 
among PCs than among socialized firms as a whole.
There is a third, but more tentative, inference to be drawn 
on income inequality. Part B of Table 2 shows data for PCs for 
a single, more recent year, 1980. Together with the data in 
Part A this provides some evidence that for PCs in all three 
sectors there has been a further narrowing of income differen­
tials over time. For example between 1976 and 1978 the decile 
ratio falls from 1.52 to 1.47 in building and from 1.55 to 1.46 
in clothing. The apparent decline of intrasectoral income dif­
ferentials within PC sectors contrasts with the increase in in­
trasectoral dispersion of incomes during the 1970's within many 
major branches of the Polish economy (Bielasiak, 1983:227).
B. Technical Efficiency
Evaluation of technical efficiency in practice is always a 
difficult task. But assessing comparative technical efficiency 
(e.g. cooperative compared to state owned) is an especially 
troublesome undertaking. In the Polish case, there is evidence 
that, compared to state owned firms, PCs use inferior quality 




























































































produce with lower quality factors of production (Skowronski,
1 41979). Since the available data from which calculations of 
technical efficiency must be made, exclude these scale and quali­
ty considerations, inevitably the comparisons will be rough ap­
proximations of true technical efficiency. Furthermore, the ne­
glect of these factors will tend to lead to underestimates of 
technical efficiency that are especially pronounced for PCs.
Against this backdrop, I begin by using data assembled by 
Kleer (1980) to derive comparative indicators of technical effi­
ciency between enterprises engaged in industrial production in 
the overall socialized sector and in the cooperative sector dur­
ing the period 1961-1978. In Part A of Table 3 I show compari­
sons of output per worker. Taken by themselves, these data imply 
that state owned firms are more productive than industrial PCs in 
Poland--from 1960-1978 output per worker is always higher on the 
average in the overall socialized sector than in PCs. This find­
ing also coincides with the views of most casual observers in­
cluding Cholaj (1979:41), who believe that labor productivity in 
Polish PCs is inferior to levels in state owned firms. Moreover, 
the apparent advantage of state owned firms seems to be growing—  
the ratio of output per worker in coops to output per worker in 
the overall sector is falling from 87% in 1970 to 75% in 1978. 
But as Part B of Table 3 shows, during this period fixed assets
per worker in PCs averaged at most 15% of the rate per worker in
1 5the socialized sector as a whole. If account is taken of these
much lower capital-labor ratios in PCs, and even assuming that
the quality of both major inputs is the same in both sectors
then, in terms of total factor productivity, PCs probably have



























































































pretation is confirmed by one of the few attempts to conduct 
carefully controlled empirical studies to measure and to ac­
count for this supposed labor productivity gap, a study by 
Skowronski (1979), who compared four state owned firms and 
four PCs in clothing. She found that both labor productivity, 
whether measured in gross or net output terms, and profitabil­
ity were lower in PCs than in state owned firms. But non-la­
bor costs per unit of output were lower and the average quali­
ty of output (as measured by comparisons of rates of sub­
standard products) somewhat higher in PCs than in state owned 
firms. Skowronski explained these findings by arguing that: 
a) state owned firms are much more capital intensive and have 
prior access to newer capital equipment; and b) PCs, despite 
difficulties in securing regular and reliable supplies of new 
materials, were able to achieve lower overall costs through 
better organization and management and less waste. Similarly 
the apparent deterioration- of PC comparative performance, as 
noted in Part A of Table 3, may be at least partially attrib­
uted to the fluctuations in rates of investment per worker be-
1 7tween the two sectors.
Other data enable intra-cooperative sectoral comparisons 
of technical efficiency to be made, rather than the intra-so- 
cialized sectoral comparison of Table 3. The data assembled 
in Table 4 compare PCs with other Polish cooperatives, i.e. 
coops which do not have well-developed provisions for worker 
participation, such as housing and retail cooperatives. These 
data show PCs as having a remarkable edge in technical effi­
ciency over other cooperatives. During 1961-1978 output per 




























































































exceeds the cooperative sector average by at least 67% (in 1961). 
The trend is unmistakenly in the direction of a growing PC advan­
tage. But what is most remarkable is that this growing advantage 
in output per worker has been achieved during a period when major 
inputs per worker allocated to PCs have grown much more slowly 
than in the overall cooperative sector. Table B shows investment 
(and consequently, fixed assets) per worker in PCs falling from 
about one third to almost one tenth of the overall cooperative 
sector averages. Taken together, these two trends indicate a
massive advantage in technical efficiency in PCs compared to oth-
1 8er Polish coops in which there is limited worker participation.
The sample data enable comparisons to be drawn between indi­
cators for the overall economy and PC sectors during a more re­
cent period, namely 1976-1980. Growth rates for labor and capi-
v
tal productivity are shown in Table 5 for sample PCs in cloth, 
print and building and, as calculated by Gomulka (1982) for the 
whole economy. With respect to labor productivity, no clear pic­
ture emerges. While in some years PCs tend to better than the 
overall system, this is not always true. For example, by this 
measure, the performance of print PCs is inferior to the whole 
system in both 1979--output per worker fell in printing PCs at a 
rate of 4.3% compared to 1.5% overall— and in 1978, but is supe­
rior in the other two years. But during this period, PCs clearly 
do better from the standpoint of capital productivity. For 
building and printing PCs this is the case for every year and 
sometimes, by a large margin— in 1980 printing PCs have an advan­
tage of more than 15%. In clothing too, PCs perform well by this 





























































































By using an enterprise level data set on PCs for 1976-80 and 
various internal cooperative documents that refer mainly to 1960— 
1978, we are able in a preliminary way to evaluate the technical 
and distributive efficiency of Polish PCs. All measures of in­
ter-enterprise income distribution show, for 1976-1981, much 
smaller dispersion among PCs than among state owned firms. Also, 
there is slight evidence for PCs of a narrowing of income differ­
ences during the most recent period for which data are available, 
a period of major turbulence in Polish society. On the matter of 
technical efficiency, though the available data lack important 
quality dimensions and consequently comparisons usually are not 
as accurately made, it seems reasonable to conclude that during 
1960-1980 the technical efficiency of PCs was at least as good as 
Polish state owned firms. Indeed, if allowance is made for the 
poorer quality of PC factors of production, the use of second­
hand supplies and older technologies by firms that are smaller 
than -non-participatory firms in similar industries, then it is 
probably reasonable to conclude that during 1960-1980 PCs were 
more technically efficient than other Polish firms. In particu­
lar, PCs seem to have made more efficient use of capital than 
state owned firms. PCs have a decided and growing advantage com­
pared to other cooperatives.
This preliminary evidence calls into question the validity 
of our interpretation of the conventional academic view exempli­
fied by the work of Brus (1975) or Gomulka (1977). This holds 
that systemic factors such as planning and party domination will 




























































































pronounced differences in technical and distributive efficiency 
will be expected, except insofar as state policy has a differen­
tial impact. While the authorities' emphasis on distributional 
and technical efficiency goals does vary over time (Woodall, 
1982), and while there are important differences in policy to­
wards PCs and state owned firms (e.g. allocation of investment 
funds), there is no evidence that the authorities have advocated 
differential policies towards PCs and other firms which would 
account for the particular differences in distributive and tech­
nical efficiency, which are noted in this study.
Instead the evidence offers support for the views of those 
(e.g. Vanek, 1975, and Horvat, 1982) who argue that worker par­
ticipation in decision making and through various material in- 
1 9centives can be expected to result in higher technical and 
distributive efficiency. Equally the preliminary evidence casts 
doubt on the views of those who predict that participatory firms 
will be less technically efficient than non-participatory firms. 
Also the variation across PC industries in the pattern of dis­
tributive and technical efficiency affords is consistent with 
the expectations of those who argue against a uniform and unvar­
ying set of participatory effects, but who instead expect the 
effects to vary by sector and year. Alternatively, it could be 
that there are systematic variations, but that the number of 
relevant variables is much higher and the patterns of interac­
tion are much more complicated than is implicitly assumed in the 
empirical part of this study. Finally the apparent growing ad­
vantage of PCs over state owned firms in 1980 in both distribu­
tive and technical efficiency is noteworthy. It is consistent 




























































































enterprises that vary with the nature of the organization. As 
such it is at odds with those who predict such linkages between 
the context and the organization but who do not expect differ­
ences in effects among organizations (e.g., Brus (1975), 
Drewnowski (1 982) ) .
The above accounting for the differences in efficiency is, 
of course, not the only possible one. In any event it is based 
on preliminary evidence. In addition to tighter theoretical 
modeling, further empirical research is needed in a number of 
areas. It is most important to substantiate the factual find­
ings of this study. Ideally such research would be based on 
matching enterprise level data for the various forms of Polish 
firms. In addition to providing for tighter controls in re­
search design, this would enable indicators of technical effi­
ciency such as total factor productivity to be calculated.
This would provide better estimates of, for example, the extent 
of technical inefficiency in state owned firms, estimates which 
at the moment we can only make by inferences drawn from the PC 
data alone. A second direction for future empirical research 
is to undertake specific tests of hypotheses which provide com­
peting explanations for the existence of differences in effi- 
20ciency.“ Thirdly, there is a need for future studies which 
would shed light on other important but currently unexplained 
issues such as the nature of the job and wage structures within 
PCs and other Polish firms and the ways in which party influ­
ence is manifested. Similar studies for other East European 
economies should be done to ascertain whether or not the Polish 
case is representative for command economies. Finally, there 




























































































studies that include Polish PCs. The important similarities in
the institutional arrangements within Polish and Mondragon PCs, on
the one hand, and on the other hand the apparent strong perform-
21ance of both organizations within each country, is deserving of 
much more detailed investigation.
As economic and political crises continue in Poland, the ten­
tative policy implication of the study is to expect further growth
22in the PC sector both in the short term and in the long term.
In part this will result from stronger growth in the PC sector 
which, in turn, reflects a better economic performance of the PC 
sector relative to an increasingly inefficient state-owned primary 
sector. In part this may result from deliberate reforms, which 
are initiated not only because a bigger PC sector is economically 
attractive to the state but also because it is politically and 
ideologically acceptable. In particular, if the emergence of 
large inequalities in Polish society during the 1970's is a prin­
cipal cause of the continuing Polish economic crisis (Pohorille, 
1982) as well as the reason during the late 1970's and early 
1980's for the politicization of the Polish working class 
(Bielasiak, 1983), then there are strong economic and political 
arguments for expanding the PC sector, a sector characterized by 
intra-sectoral income differentials that are modest by comparison 
with similar differences in the state sector. At the same time 
such reformism, if it continues and if it is economically success­
ful, may feed on itself and also produce important socio-economic 
changes such as a flowering of de facto democracy. And since 
these developments would be gradual and not as conspicuous as the 
changes promised by the recent renewal movement, the growth of the 
PC sector, by promoting more subtle developments, might end up by 
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1. All entries are averages and per firm, except for BONUS,
SHKAP, LOANS and RES which are per worker. (For definitions, 
see Appendix.)
2. All values are in thousands of U.S. dollars (for the periods 
noted and using exchange rates as indicated) except K and V 
which are in millions of dollars.
3. Data for France are for 1978 and are taken from Estrin and 
Jones (1983). In 1978 01 = 4.2 francs.
4. Data for Italy are for 1976-80 and are taken from Jones and 
Svejnar (1 983). In 1 978 01 = 800 lire.
5. Data for United Kingdom are for 1968 and are taken from Jones 
(1 982). In 1 968, 01 = .41 7 pounds.
6. Data for Spain (Mondragon) are for 1979 and are calculated 
from Thomas and Logan (1 982) except for LONG which is computed 
from Campbell et al. (1977) and remaining variables which were 
provided by CLP. SHKAP data are workers who have been with 
the firm for 20 years or more. In 1979 01 = 70 pesetas.
7. Data for U.S.A. are for 19-82 and are taken from Gunn (1 984).
8. Data for Poland are derived from the survey as described in 
the Appendix. In 1976-80 the official exchange rate 01 = 35 
zloty.
9. While WKBD figures for Italy and France are not available, 
they require at least 2/3 of the board to be workers.
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in Socialized Industry and Producer Cooperative Industry 
A. OUTPUT PER WORKER
Producer
Cooperative Socialized Ratio (%
1960 149 1 85 81
1965 1 77 211 84
1 970 229 262 87
1 971 231 274 84
1 974 287 349 82
1 975 289 375 77
1 976 304 409 74
1 977 31 9 434 74
1 978 334 445 75
FIXED ASSETS PER WORKER
Producer
Cooperative Socialized Ratio (%
1 960 21 1 67 13
1965 22 1 73 1 3
1 970 1 6 202 8
1 971 1 8 206 9
1974 26 238 11
1 975 41 265 15
1 976 31 343 9
1 977 35 327 11
1 978 38 355 11
Notes
1. Value entries are in thousands of zlotys and are in current 
prices.
2. Ratios express producer cooperative figures as a percent of 
figures for socialized industry.
3. All data refer to enterprises engaged m  material production; 
services are excluded.































































































in the Overall Cooperative Sector and in Work Cooperatives
WORK COOPS COOP SECTOR RATIOS %
Q/L I/L FA/L Q/L I/L FA/L Q/L I/L FA/L
1961 65 2.5 21 39 7.4 42 1 67 33 50
1965 81 2.3 22 45 9.2 62 1 80 25 35
1970 1 1 9 3.6 1 6 53 17.4 1 1 1 225 21 1 4
1971 11 7 3.9 1 8 56 19.9 120 209 20 15
1974 1 50 6.5 26 63 29.6 1 48 238 22 1 8
1975 170 5.5 41 64 35.0 1 54 266 1 6 27
1976 1 98 6.5 31 70 43.5 1 51 283 1 5 21
1977 224 5.8 35 80 49.7 1 91 284 1 2 18
1978 241 6.3 38 85 54.8 21 9 284 11 17
NOTES
1 . Values entered are in thousands of zloty and are in current
prices.
2. Ratios express producer cooperative figures on a percent of 
figure for the overall cooperative sector.
3. Data are for industrial and service activities.
SOURCE
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1. For empirical evaluations of the performance of PCs and the 
Yugoslav self-managed system, see Jones and Svejnar (eds.)
(1 982) .
2. Note in particular that the Polish system of PCs has been ad­
vanced as a development model and for imitation as a means of 
aiding the disabled. (See I.L.O., 1978, 1980.)
3. For expanded amounts of the institutional framework see Jones 
(1 984) and Kowalak (1981).
4. Since 1960 the continued growth in the size of the industrial 
PC sector has been sustained by the development of an impor­
tant Polish species of industrial PC, namely cooperatives for 
the disabled. Their growth reflects early successes in reha­
bilitation, as well as providing jobs mainly for war inva­
lids. This, in turn, led to the state in 1959 introducing 
measures which both encouraged the development of an institu­
tional support system and provided the financial wherewithal 
to facilitate such growth. See I.L.O., 1978.
5. Article II expresses the state's desire to promote coopera­
tives and promises to provide state assistance in that task.
6. But for an exception see Kornai (1 980) . Also, while I be­
lieve that East European specialists have not published much 
theoretical work in English on cooperatives (Yugoslavia ex­





























































































7. A firm is considered to be technically more efficient than an­
other if, for a given input(s) it produces more output. While 
this definition is not too controversial, as Buck (1982:4) 
notes, there is no general agreement on the exact meaning of 
distributive efficiency. Here we follow Buck and define dis­
tributive efficiency as the degree to which the actual distri­
bution of income corresponds to the supposed desirable distri­
bution. I focus discussion on these particular components of 
economic efficiency because of their importance in the litera­
ture on Eastern European economies.
8. Those policies introduced in the early 1970's that promoted 
the development of larger productive units (see Wanless, 1980) 
would be expected to lead to bigger changes in the average 
size of firms in the state owned sector, compared to firms, 
including PCs, in the cooperative sector. Therefore, to the 
extent that returns to scale exist, the differential impact of 
this policy would be expected, other things equal, to improve 
the relative technical efficiency of state owned compared to 
cooperative firms.
9. This is not to say that efficiency would be unaffected by pol­
icy changes. Brus (1 975:1 91), for example, would expect those 
policy changes producing greater political participation out­
side enterprise to be associated with higher efficiency within 
enterprises. Gomulka (1977) too expects a similar relation­
ship though his view of the precise nature of the causal link­
ages differs much from that of Brus. Both agree, however, 
that because of étatization within firms, policy changes of 





























































































10. In some literature, the main interest has been to consider 
the particular ways in which participation could be expect­
ed to cause changes in efficiency. For a review of some of 
these arguments see Jones and Svejnar (1982).
11. In the context of a centrally planned economy, however, it 
is likely that Jensen and Meckling would modify the thrust 
of their argument.
12. I do not report comparisons using more extreme indicators 
of income inequalities, such as POQ/P_, because of the lim-jo 2
ited number of observations available for PCs.
13. Both measures are calculated since it is not obvious which 
measure is used by Flakierski.
14., Both the quality of labor and capital is lower in Polish
PCs than in state-owned firms, in part because the planning 
process is much more sensitive to the needs of state-owned 
.firms. For example, it is unlikely that much of the capi­
tal imported into Poland during the 1970's ended up in PCs. 
The employment of many relatively unskilled people and dis­
abled workers in PCs inevitably tends to depress the aver­
age quality of labor.
15. The figures for PCs are for net fixed assets whereas for
the overall socialized sector, only gross value figures are 
available. This procedure will tend to exaggerate reported 
(net fixed assets) PC capital-labor ratios by about 10% 
over what they would have been if gross value data were 
available. In other words, the ratio figures, whereby PC 
capital-labor ratios are expressed as a percentage of fig­
ures for all socialized industry, probably represent an up­




























































































16. Since the labor/output ratio is higher and the capital/output 
ratio is smaller in PCs, the joint productivity depends on the 
size of the capital weights used. Though these data are not 
available, using capital weights in the usual ranges confirms 
higher technical efficiency in PCs.
17. During 1961-65 investment per worker in PCs amounted to about 
24,000 zloty, roughly 31% of the corresponding figures for the 
overall socialized sector. During 1966-70 the corresponding 
figures were 32,000 zloty (30%), in 1971-75 60,000 (36%) and 
in 1976-1978, 47,000 (27%). Figures derived from Tables 17-18 
of Kleer (1 980) .
18. Various writers suggest that prices received by producers in 
PCs are closer to market prices than in the non PC segment of 
the cooperative sector. If so, this would account for some of 
the apparent PC advantage, though surely not all.
19. In Jones (1983) I present more detailed information on the na­
ture 'and scope of worker participation in Polish PCs. I ten­
tatively conclude that the variety of channels that exist to 
provide for worker participation in Polish PCs do both facili­
tate a measure of worker influence in decision making and con­
stitute a series of economic incentives.
20. For example, the author is currently undertaking an economic 
study of Polish PCs in which competing hypotheses on the tech­
nical efficiency effects of worker participation are tested. 
For sample PCs, where variable values for the different chan­
nels of participation vary widely, I plan to estimate the pro­





























































































21. For the Mondragon case see Thomas and Logan (1982).
22. In another paper (Jones, 1982a) I develop and advance this 



























































































The Data and the Variables
APPENDIX
A. The Data
The data were made available to Jones by officials of the 
CZSP during work which was funded in part, and as part of a larger 
project, by the Leverhulme Trust. Data analysis was undertaken 
while the author was a German Marshall Fund Fellow.
The data were gathered in a survey using an instrument de­
signed by Jones and administered by officials of the CZSP, the or­
ganization to which all Polish PCs belonged in 1981. For each of 
three industries— cloth, print and construction— societies to be 
surveyed were selected randomly from lists of members. These in­
dustries were selected in large part because of their importance 
in Polish industry. For example in 1980 Polish clothing PCs ac­
counted for about 42% and printing for about 39% of that indus­
try's output (Table 2). Only societies which were neither agri­
cultural nor coops for disabled were sampled. In 1980, there were 
about 1100 PCs of this type. The sample comprised 63 PCs and data 
were gathered for 5 years.
B. Variables
MEMB = Proportion of the labor force that are worker mem­
bers.
CEEMEM = Proportion of the membership that serve on a commit- 
----- _ tee.






































































































K = FA 
I
V = Q
= Surplus distributed to workers.
= Share (social) capital owned by each worker mem­
ber .
= Proportion of fixed assets owned by workers.
= Proportion of the member capital owned by work­
ers.
= Surplus distributed per worker member.
= Loans per worker member.
- Reserves per worker member.
from
= Monthly earnings (excludes bonus).
= Labor force.
= Fixed assets.
= Investment in fixed assets.
= Value added.
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